I am 13% up month-to-date, which has outperformed the S&P 500 in the same time period (7.6%). However, I feel that I am not capitalizing enough on this recent surge up in the marketplace. Note the word “feel” is usually very inconsistent with rational thinking when it comes to the market. My strategy is working when I look at it rationally, but it doesn’t feel like it is working.
My portfolio at the moment is structured in significantly lower risk investments than equity (consisting mainly of asset-backed trusts, of which the assets are long-term corporate debt) and as a result, my performance had I bought the equity of these firms vs. the debt is lower than it should be.
However, when one looks at the risk-adjusted returns, I am reasonably sure if I don’t do something stupid and start selling off securities that I would be looking at a good year financially – both in terms of income from investments and unrealized capital gains, and all of this with little equity risk. It is relatively “easy” when the cost base on most of these investments implies a current yield on capital of around 20%, but this is what a financial crisis is good for. If necessary, if the market disappeared for these securities, and I was not able to liquidate them, I would easily willing to hold them until 2028/2033, as the case may be simply because I have exchanged a dollar today for 20 cents each and every year in the future, plus a 3 dollar payout at the end of 19/24 years.
I still have a lingering feeling that I should be able to do better in the future, but getting “greedy” and taking stupider risks (i.e. moving heavily into equities) may not be the smartest of moves, as my fundamental baseline projection was that the markets would see-saw for the year and net returns would be roughly zero as dilution and higher credit costs get factored into the bottom line earnings per share for companies. There will be a lot of whipsaw of prices as the sentiment shifts from euphoric (as it is currently) to something more sedate (when banks announce another wave of financing required to stabilize their balance sheets).
Investing is very difficult because past information on trading prices is mostly irrelevant.
It is very easy to say “I wish I had put my life savings in Bank of America at $2.54 per share, and sold it today at $7.80 and tripled my money like hitting blackjack twice in a casino”, simply because such an execution would have been impossible. There is no way of knowing whether $2.54 is the bottom, or whether the stock will go all the way down to $1/share before bouncing up (assuming it even bounces). I have looked at some of my entries into the fixed income security markets and could have received prices 10 or 20% lower (and in one not-so-greatly timed case 40%), but it is impossible to know how low a panicked investor will take a security. An excellent and real-life example is the following:

This is a chart of one of ING Groep’s (the large Dutch bank) hybrid security – above common stock in seniority but lower than bonds. Essentially it can be treated as a bank preferred share, but it is bond-like in that it gives out interest. The risk to investors is that ING Groep can defer interest payments for up to five years. ISG gives out about 38 cents each quarter, or about $1.51 a year (coupon rate is 6.125% for those that care), and its “par value” is $25/share. I did my due diligence on ING and saw how they got caught up in the financial crisis, and also saw how they got themselves bailed out of it by the Dutch government in a rather well-structured deal. The important part is that the Dutch stake was senior to common shareholders, but junior to the hybrid securities, so a common share dividend suspension will not necessarily hurt the hybrid security owners.
I came to the conclusion, after doing a massive amount of research, that ING would continue to pay off. This was the beginning of February. So I told myself “OK, I think something else will hit the fan, but I will start acquiring units if ISG trades from 6.50 to 4.50, since there is no way that this thing can trade greater than an implied yield of 33% a year.”. Low and behold, a week later, the stock crashes, and I get a fill in for my full position, averaged at around 5.50 per share. That’s about 27% a year assuming they continue to pay off (plus a huge capital gain later when the markets stabilize).
Of course the market had other ideas – they took ISG all the way down to $2.84 a share before the last dumpers to the market abated. At that price, you could have covered your capital costs in two years, and currently be sitting on capital that is worth roughly 3 times what you paid for.
Why didn’t I just set a huge order at $3/share? Because I had no idea that it would go that low, and because I have a strong rule of not concentrating too heavily on very speculative issues – certainly the market was signaling a very strong predicted chance that ING may decide to conserve capital by just not paying off their hybrid security owners. I didn’t think it was as likely as the market, which made it a proper bet. But my bet was poorly timed – if I had set my parameters to $5.50/unit to $3.50/unit, I could be sitting on double my money right now instead of a 50% gain.
Finally in a day like today, ING equity is up 24% while the hybrid security is up 8.5%. 8.5% is still not bad, but it makes you feel like you’re missing out on something (when rationally this is the less riskier decision made – less capital appreciation for a higher chance of being able to get those income payments).
This is why I ask in the title of this post, “How much is too much?” Even right now the securities current yield is about 18.4%, and this is a very high number, and the market still thinks there’s a considerable chance that ING will pull the plug on the interest payments. I still don’t think so, and I think the market is wrong, but it’s a risk that I find acceptable to take since I don’t have 100% of my portfolio in this thing.
This is what frustrates a lot of people in that looking at stock charts and previous quotes brings up a very human emotion of “I could have done that”, when in reality there is no way you can lock gains in by trading from past charts.
Scam artist booksellers (best example is Wade Cook) try to write books that, at its core, advocate trading using past information.
Most mutual fund advertising is the same. This should be point number five on Raven’s list why mutual funds are horrible investment vehicles.