In my previous article, I received a comment from Max Anderson. I figured it was better replying here than in the comments section of the weblog. Max wrote:
Your support for BC-STV is appreciated. But your comment 02/28/2005 “The yes side should be advertising the best benefit of STV, which is that it reduces the power of political parties” is controversial. In some views, the larger, multi-member constituencies under BC-STV will make candidates more financially dependent on party support and more puppet-like, as in Ireland’s STV where party representatives never dare vote against the party line. That’s the opposite of what most British Columbians want, and would not help sell BC-STV. Perhaps you meant BC-STV would cut into the dictatorial power of the governing party vis-a-vis the premier’s office by keeping out artificial majority governments?
I stand by my original comments – the primary benefit of BC-STV is that if implemented, political parties will have less power than they do currently because of the capability of individual MLAs to vote against the party line if their voting district strongly disagrees on an issue. It won’t happen often, but it will happen when you have enough single-issue voters that will abandon you in the next election if you so happen to vote in the wrong direction. Federal examples include abortion, gun control, right-to-die, etc. Provincially, healthcare and drug access is a single-issue to many of the age 55+ population (who incidentally vote more per capita than any other age group).
With the existing system if you run as an independent, you will lose. Elayne Brenzinger (Surrey-Newton) and Paul Nettleton (Prince George-Mount Robson) will be 2005′s examples. In the 2001 election it was Rick Kasper (Malahat-Juan de Fuca), a former NDP candidate that bolted away from his party. John Nunziata was a federal textbook example (he actually managed to win as an independent on his first try, but lost in the next election when the Liberals brought in a star candidate to take him out). With BC-STV, the chances of getting elected as an independent candidate is significantly greater than with the existing system. This decreases the power of parties, as there is less punishment for not maintaining discipline.
The ability to rebel against party leadership is critical. This will happen more often with BC-STV. But just like in a game of chess, the threat is sufficient, not the actual act (e.g. voting against the budget). This is why you don’t see members of parties voting against confidence bills in any parliament around the world, including Ireland. With BC-STV, individual politicians cannot be further chained to their political parties than they are presently. This power may not be seen in the form of a vote in the Legislature, but individual members will certainly have more power in caucus even in a majority government.
About campaign financing, people should read the Chief Electoral Officer’s Report on the 2001 election, specifically starting on page 27, which describes how much money the parties spent. It is true that one reason why people associate with political parties is because of their ability to finance candidates. But the parties will not finance candidates if they don’t think they have a chance in the election (take a look at how much support the NDP gave their candidate in Richmond-Centre, $0!), nor will parties transfer money to candidates that are not in good standing with the party leader. If you secure your nomination by signing up 300 members and raiding the constituency association, you will receive the same financial support as an independent as you would by being in a party, which is none. Yes, it is true that the financial barrier to entering in such an election will be somewhat higher due to the expanded ridings, but this will be more than offset by the other factors I described. It is most likely that the independent candidates that do run in the election will be kicked out of the party for disagreeing with the party leader, which would give them sufficient notoriety to greatly increase their chance of being elected in the subsequent election. They won’t always get re-elected (Brenzinger would have little chance even if this election used STV), but guys like Gordon Wilson would be a safe bet.
There is another power of party leaders, and that is nominating candidates. Right now party leaders, not constituency associations, have the final say on nominations and will continue to do so – with STV, party leaders can still parachute candidates in, but the cost of bringing them in will be a lot more difficult as there is no longer the concept of a ‘safe seat’. For example, let’s take the recent nomination of Carole Taylor in Vancouver-Langara. With the existing system, Taylor has a 99% chance of getting elected. With BC-STV, the Liberals could have still nominated Carole Taylor to a consolidated riding (let’s call this “Vancouver West”, consisting of what we call today Vancouver-Burrard, Vancouver-Fairview, Vancouver-Langara, Vancouver-Point Grey, Vancouver-Quilchena), but they would have to ask themselves – will nominating Taylor cost Patrick Wong (MLA Vancouver Fairview) or Lorne Mayencourt (MLA Vancouver-Burrard) his seat? Or will the voters even give Taylor their first place votes? This is another example that demonstrates that BC-STV reduces the power of parties.
Finally, BC-STV will make it tougher (I would not say difficult) for governments to form majority governments. I do not believe that the way to reduce power of political parties with minority governments produces good governments; rather, promoting multiple individuals on the basis of merit within the parties is the most effective way. Ultimately if the voter wants a majority government, they will get one.
To conclude, I don’t see how implementing BC-STV could increase the power of political parties more than the existing first-past-the-post system, even when you account for the expanded riding sizes. I believe that decreasing the power of political parties (and empowering individuals within the party) will result in a better run political system. With BC-STV, increased riding sizes and campaign finance issues will not increase power of parties. I still maintain that the reduced power of political parties is the best selling point of BC-STV.